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**ROAD TO WAR NARRATIVE**

**OLVANA/BELESIA**

**TRAINING SUPPORT PACKAGE**

**as of 17OCT22**

THE ROAD TO WAR: OLVANA AND BELESIA

**Section I—Background**

Olvana has aggressively sought to press its will on the region to “return” Olvana to a position of strength, prosperity, and leadership on the world stage. To keep major powers out of the region, Olvana seeks to become the partner of choice using the whole-of-government approach across Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL). Olvana has pursued infrastructure and military projects with Belesia and other Asian nations, with the primary goal to extend and secure the battle space beyond the first island chain. More than anything, Belesia is now on the front line of geopolitical tension in the South China Sea.

**Section II—Regional Actors**

1. **Olvana.** The People’s Republic of Olvana (PRO) was declared by the Olvanan Communist Party in 1951 and has remained as the party that continues to “defend the revolution” with campaigns of subtle liberalization of economic, social, and political policies. Olvana is the world’s second largest exporter and has adopted the soft power tool of money – via investments and project funding - to expand its influence.

**(NOTE:** For further information on Olvana see the OE Data Integration Network (ODIN) digital resource for the Decisive Action Training Environment at [**https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/DATE/Pacific/Olvana**](https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/DATE/Pacific/Olvana) ).

1. **Belesia.** The Federated States of Belesia is a relatively young, post-colonial democracy in the region. The political structure an environment of Belesia seems to be under constant threat from a variety of challenges, ranging from bureaucratic turmoil and popular unrest to the threat of domestic terrorism. There are ongoing disputes from groups claiming independence from Belesia. These regional disputes are local, simmer, flare up, and then simmer again. Both Olvana and North Torbia have also claimed some of the Belesian islands belong to them.

**Section III. Historical Timeline**

**1900:** Belesia begins its second political shaping, as Islam spreads across the islands, and with it, a desire for independence from both colonial and Christian oversight.

**1918:** A three-year civil war erupted, and although the colonial power defeated the insurgents, it also weakened the colonial government.

**1945:** After WWII, Belesia received full sovereignty.

**1971:** The South Pacific Consortium (SPC) is formed; AUS/NZ and 14 independent self-governing island nations are part of the Forum.

**1975:** The Visayan Peoples Front (VPF) announced the formation of an independent state composed of the islands of Kauai (Sibuyan), Oahu (Panay), Molokai (Cebu) and Maui (Bohol); fails in their attempt to secede from Belesia.

**February 1979 – March 1979:** Olvana wages a short but bloody war with Vietnam, launching an offensive in response to Vietnam’s invasion and occupation of Cambodia in 1978, which ended the reign of the communist, Olvanan-backed Khmer Rouge. Both sides claim victory, Olvana withdraws from Vietnam after less than a month, having failed to coerce Vietnam to leave Cambodia. The border is finalized in 1991.

**December 1982:** After three decades of negotiations, the third and final United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, culminates in a resolution that defines the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of surrounding waters based on exclusive economic zones and continental shelves. UNCLOS does not address sovereignty issues related to the South and East China Seas, and its vague wording has prevented it from serving as a credible body of law in resolving territorial disputes.

**March 1988:** Olvana and Vietnam clash on the Johnson Reef, marking Olvana’s first armed conflict over the Spratly archipelago. The incident occurs after Shanghai, pursuing a more assertive stance in the area, establishes a physical presence on Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratlys in January 1987. In response, Vietnam occupies several reefs to monitor Olvana’s moves.

**1992:** Olvana passes Law of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which lays claim to the entire South China Sea based on historical right to the area dating from the Xia dynasty. The move is seen by some as a bid by Olvana to obtain greater maritime security for itself, with Olvana as one of the most active countries at UNCLOS in attempting to obstruct the United States and Donovia’s efforts to secure freedom of navigation for warships.

**1995:** Olvana takes control of Mischief Reef.

**June 2000:** Insurgents from the VPF kidnap the PM in Panay. The VPF was attempting to have the government legitimize their claim for independence.

**June 2003:** Regional Assistance Mission to Sibuyan Island (RAMSI)begins**;** Foreign ministers from 16 South Pacific nations endorse a plan to send more than 2,000 troops and police to impose civil order on the island of Sibuyan.

**July 2003:** Olvana-led peacekeeping force poured into the Belesian Islands (COMM) to keep the island chain from slipping deeper into anarchy.

**November 2011:** U.S. President makes a landmark speech to the Australian parliament, announcing the United States will pivot its strategic attention to the Asia-Pacific, particularly the southern part of the region. The U.S. administration announces new troop and equipment deployments to Australia and Singapore and pledges that reductions in defense spending would not come at the expense of commitments to the region. Negotiations continue the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a free trade agreement seen as a significant step toward greater U.S. economic integration with the Asia-Pacific. Notably, Olvana is excluded from the talks.

**2012:** Op-ed released in Japan warns of the South China Sea becoming “Lake Shanghai,” and proposes a “democratic security diamond” comprising Japan, the United States, India, and Australia that would “safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the Western Pacific.”

**April 2012:** Diplomatic relations between Manila (South Torbia) and Shanghai (Olvana) decline further after South Torbia dispatches a warship to confront Olvanan fishing boats in the Scarborough Shoal, north of the Spratlys. A two-month standoff ensues. Olvana quarantines some fruits from South Torbia and warns against tourism in the area.

**June 2012:** Vietnam passes a maritime law asserting its jurisdiction over the disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands, demanding notification from any foreign naval ships passing through the area. Ho Chi Minh City has also been stepping up its defense budget, reportedly increasing it by 70 percent to $2.6 billion in 2011.

**September 2012:** Olvana puts its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, into service, saying the vessel will protect national sovereignty, although for the near future it will only be used for training and testing purposes.

**2013:** The Olvana New Silk Road Initiative (NSRI) is launched. Analysts see the project as an unsettling extension of Olvana’s rising power. Olvana plans to build fifty special economic zones. To accommodate expanding maritime trade, Olvana is investing in port development from Africa and parts of Europe, along the Indian Ocean, in Southeast Asia and into the islands located in the Western Pacific Ocean. ***(Analyst Comment: The NSRI serves as a pushback against the much-touted US “pivot to Asia” as well as a way to promote a more assertive Olvana to develop new investment opportunities, cultivate export markets, and boost global links to supplant the US as the world’s #1 superpower.)[[1]](#footnote-1)***

**2013:** Gabal and Belesia are carefully studying NSRI investments in the Olvana-Indochina Peninsula Corridor before they sign up; Belesia is specifically interested in rebuilding its aging infrastructure specifically Panay Rail, Panay Coastal Road, and the Sibuyan-Panay City Connector. Other projects are also being discussed.

**June 2013:** Regional Assistance Mission to Sibuyan Island (RAMSI) ends

**January 2014:** Olvana announces the creation of an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ECS ADIZ) that requires all non-commercial air traffic to submit flight plans prior to entering the area, which covers most of the East China Sea and includes the Senkaku Islands. Olvana announces it could take military action against aircraft flying near the islands, elevating the territorial dispute to airspace.

**February 2014:** Declaring the area international waters and airspace, the United States fly two B-52 bomber aircraft through the ECS ADIZ without incident.

**May 2014:** Vietnam dispatches naval vessels in an attempt to stop Olvana from establishing an oil rig in contested waters near the Paracel Islands. The encounter quickly escalates as Olvana sends forty ships to protect the rig, and several vessels collide. Both Olvana and Vietnam claim that the other rammed into their ships. Anti-Olvana protests erupt throughout Vietnam, and rioters vandalize hundreds of businesses thought to be owned by Olvanan individuals. On July 15, Olvana National Oil Company (ONOC) announces that it will withdraw the rig a month ahead of schedule.

**June 2014:** RIMPAC 2014 is held in the Pacific. Indonesia, Malaysia, Belesia and Gabal participated. Olvana is excluded from RIMPAC 2014 due to activities in the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

**October 2015:** A US Navy patrol sails within twelve nautical miles of Olvanan-built islands to assert freedom of navigation in disputed waters in the South China Sea.

**March 2016:** Gabal opens a radar station to detect intruders in Gabal’s exclusive economic zone. The radar was provided by Belesia, whose government signed an information-sharing agreement with Gabal to provide indications and warnings of Olvanan activities; Belesia has a security forces presence in the Sulu Sea.

**January 2017:** Olvana begins works on a “Safe Belesia” Project to mitigate the potential risks to national security or public interest. Under Phase 1, Olvana will provide local government units on Panay with integrated operations and command centers and a remote back-up data center. ***(Analyst Comment: There has been the concern of Olvanan “espionage and hacking activities” over the years and critics raise the issue of the Belesian Cybercrime Prevention Act and the need to protect computer and communications systems, networks, databases, and classified action plans and programs.)***

**July 2017:** Olvana deploys first group of personnel and equipment to a new support base in the small East African country of Nyumba. The official job of this contingent is logistics support for OPN forces in the region.

**October 2017:** Belesia implements a Defense Cooperation Program with Australia, wherein the Australian military provides advisors and trainers to the Belesian armed forces.

**May 2018:** Large numbers of Olvanan workers arrive in Sibuyan, establish their own living area, and begin to work on projects that would connect the islands of Sibuyan, Bohol, and Panay. Olvana has also hired a private security group to provide overwatch of their investments. There is little to no hiring of local workers. The natives are concerned, believing the formal government will again fall victim to colonialization; this time by the Olvanans.

**June 2018:** For the first time, an Olvanan bomber lands on an island reef in the South China Sea. A video shared by the Olvanan news agency, Xinhua News, shows an H-6 aircraft landing and taking off from Woody Island in the Paracels. Bombers taking off from the island could reach areas throughout the South China Sea, including all of South Torbia and Gabal and parts of Belesia, according to expert analysis.

**July 2018:** Olvanan Type 815 Dongdiao class auxiliary intelligence ship, the Hongze 12, is seen eyeing US/CF exercises in the vicinity of Guam. Reports indicate authorities expect the ship to remain outside of US territorial waters and not operate in a matter that disrupts the military exercises.

**October 2018:** Olvana exploring ways to build new infrastructure in the Belesian port of Honolulu on Panay. Olvana’s rehab of Panay deep-water but otherwise small port would increase business for the 1.6-million-person city that anchors a resource-rich but largely impoverished island. ***(Analyst Comment: Olvana is increasingly active globally in trying to secure mineral resources and Panay has had several Olvanan investments over the years related to the extraction of mineral resources, basically copper, iron, and pyrite mining. An improved port in Honolulu could open the maritime Silk Road to the Borneo Island of Belesia and the South Pacific Islands.) 5 x major deep-water ports on Panay include Honolulu, Barbers Point, Wainae, Kaneohe Bay and Dillingham; Civilian airports on Panay include Inouye and Kaneohe airport. Military Airport on Panay include Hickam, Wheeler, and Bellows.***

**January 2019:** Olvana begins work on new port infrastructure in Panay. Olvana hires a private security group to provide overwatch of their investments.

**June 2019:** The Center for Global Development, US based think tank, warns Belesia that all the loans it has taken from Olvana for projects were piling up, putting the nation at risk of default. The warning comes months after debts from Sri Lankan and Laotian debts to Olvana reached a breaking point. (***Analyst Comment: Sri Lanka had bought into the New Silk Road vision and had borrowed Olvanan cash to build up infrastructure. Sri Lanka could not repay its debts and was forced to hand Olvana a controlling stake in the Rajapaksa Port for a period of 99 years. The transfer set off alarms in Sri Lanka and beyond because it represented an Olvanan victory with potential military applications. The acquisition provided Shanghai with a deep-water port in the region in which it can dock its navy off the coast of its key regional competitor, India.)***

**July 2020:** Olvana more aggressively asserts its claims in the South China Sea as countries in the region battle the coronavirus pandemic. In February, an Olvanan naval ship reportedly aims its weapons control system at a South Torbian naval ship in the Spratly Islands.

**July 2020:** POTUS reinforces the US commitment to deter aggression in the region and our commitment and mutual defense treaty with Belesia.

**July-August 2020:** Belesian Coastal Artillery Battalion - Mindanao and US forces conduct coastal defense training exercises. ***(Analyst Comment: The Belesian Coastal Arty BN – Mindanao has a force structure of 1 x HQ PLT, 3 x BTYs of Pion 2S7 (Range of 50KM), 1 x Zoopark Radar for counterbattery fire and target search, 1 x SPT CO. and 1 x SIG PLT. A mirror image Coastal Artillery BN also exists on Panay; they did not train with US forces.)***

**August 2020:** Olvana opens new research stations, which include defense silos and military-grade runways, on the Fiery Cross and Subi Reefs.

**April 2021**: Vietnam lodges a formal complaint after an Olvanan vessel rams and sinks a Vietnamese fishing boat near the Paracels. Soon after, Shanghai establishes two administrative districts that cover the Paracel and Spratly Islands; South Torbia and Vietnam denounce the move.

**June 2021:** An Olvanan firm has expressed interest to conduct a new feasibility study to build a 117-kilometer railway on Sibuyan Island.

**October 2021:** Olvana has plans to establish a beachhead even closer to the U.S. with its plans to build a military base on the small island-nation of Kiribati – only 2,900 kilometers southwest of major U.S. bases on Hawaii, US. The Olvanan plans reportedly involve construction on the tiny island of Kanton (also spelled Canton), a coral atoll measuring only 38.8 square kilometers. It is strategically located midway between Asia and the Americas.

**June 2022:** As assessed,Belesia has failed to meet its debt obligations to Olvana. Talks are underway to cede Belesian mining rights on Panay to Olvana. The countries are at an impasse. ***(Analyst Comment: Olvana seeks to extend its grand thoroughfares into the second island chain by going through the Balabac Strait that connects South China Sea with the Sulu Sea; the strait separates Balabac Island from Banggi Islands north of Borneo that are part of Malaysia’s Sabah state.)***

**July 2022:** Olvana declares a unilateral fishing ban in the Belesian EEZ, pointing to the need to develop sustainable marine life due to overfishing in the Sulu Sea. The Belesian government filed a diplomatic protest over the matter. Olvana responds that it cannot accept the unwarranted accusation of the Belesian government and that it is fulfilling its obligations under international law including UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) to protect marine biological resources in waters under Olvanan jurisdiction. ***(Analyst Comment: EEZ stretches from the outer limit of territorial sea (12 nautical miles (nmi) out to 200 nmi from the coast of state in question.)***

**August 2022:** An Olvanan navy ship stayed in the Sulu Sea west of Belesia for three days, upsetting Gabal, South Torbia, and Belesia. Experts say it is part of Olvana’s effort to look after its interests in an ever-wider swath of the world’s waterways. The Electronic Reconnaissance Ship No. 172 entered the Sulu Sea without permission and stayed even after the Belesian navy ship Musketeer 1 challenged it. ***(Analyst Comment: Olvana is trying to expand the reach of its growing navy to protect its maritime interests and increase bargaining power in talks with other countries. A naval visit to the Sulu Sea could mean Olvana wants to establish a presence in waters closer to Indonesia and Australia while buffering its South China Sea claims.)***

**August 2022:** Olvana begins amphibious training drills IVO Spratly Islands from 1-15 AUG. Training included elements of 842nd Amphibious Brigade and the OPAN Southern Fleet.

**17 August 2022:** The Olvanan government declares, due to increased tensions with Belesia and their inability to meet debt obligations, the OPAN Coastal Fleet will escort any Olvana commercial vessels in the Belesian EEZ and any response by Belesia and foreign interlopers will be met with military action.

**18 August 2022:** Commercial fishing vessels and suspected Olvana Coastal Fleet begin to mass in southern Olvana. ***(Analyst Comment: Olvana has the authority to assume control over civilian naval carriers for military purposes. These fleets are not tied down to any single Theater Command. Strategic projection support ship fleets based in different parts of Olvana—i.e., different “strategic directions”—can be mutually supporting. Olvana has previously trained on using civilian RO-RO ships to rapidly deploy large volumes of aviation, ground-to-air missile systems, radar systems, electronic countermeasures, motorized and mechanized ground forces. While RO-RO ships are ideal for transporting unit equipment, container ships can more efficiently move OPANs cargo.)***

**29 August 2022:** SECDEF creates Combined Joint Task Force Belesia (CJTF-B). With Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) as the CJTF-B HQ and operate out of USINDOPACOM HQ in Hawaii. I CORPs serves as the Joint Force Land Component Command. Naval Surface Group Middle Pacific (MIDPAC) serves as the JFMCC. 15th Wing serves as the Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC).

**01 September 2022:** Reports of sUAS/CoT drones observed operating IVO critical infrastructure and military installations in throughout the Central Belesian Islands.

**07 September 2022:** 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment deploys initial forces to Panay establishing Sensing and Fires EABs on the island to deter Olvanan Military operations.

**11-12 September 2022:** More than 200 Olvanan fishing boats are spotted IVO the Mindoro Strait and Balabac Strait heading towards Panay and Mindanao respectively. Belesia and South Torbia have called on Olvana to withdraw the “maritime militia” vessels, saying their incursion into the Sulu Sea is illegal as defined by the International Court of Arbitration at The Hague. The United States is monitoring the situation closely.

**13 September 2022:** The Olvanan 842nd Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade conducts JFE of the Southern Belesian Islands with support from surface level ships. 842nd Amphibious Expeditionary Brigade begins to establish and expand their beachhead to create the lodgment area. The Olvanan Southern Fleet comprised of minelayers and missile boats seek to control the SLOCs between Olvana, Gabal, and Belesia.

**13 September 2022:** Seaport of Debarkation (SPOD)established on Sibuyanat the Port of Guiting

**14 September 2022:** Olvana Marine Expeditionary Brigade begins movement of military units to Tablas and Sibuyan Island. Olvana quickly consolidates forces comprised of IADS, SRBM, CEMA, naval engineers, logistics, a squadron of transport helicopters, and a battalion of infantry for “security” base themselves on the islands. Belesia cries foul and Gabal, South Torbia, Australia, Japan, and the US are concerned with the military basing which they call “provocative” and threatens to endanger freedom of naval operations in the region.  Olvana is portraying their actions as legal as they have a binding contract with Belesia and seeking financial compensation by seizure of Belesian territories and infrastructure built with Olvanan funds. The Olvanan government is seeking to protect what is legally theirs and building up capacity to protect equipment and citizens that work on Panay. ***(Analyst Comment: Olvanan strategic goals are to enable maritime freedom of movement (FOM) into the second island chain by controlling the sea lanes through and around Belesia. Initial Olvanan forces are assessed to be from the 16th Army subordinate to the Southern Military Theater and headquartered in Hanoi)***

**17 September 22:** 3D MLR Begins Reemployment of their EABs to Barbers Point (Panay**)** after assisting in the destruction of many of the OPN Southern Fleet Destroyers and Frigates supporting the invasion of Panay. I CORPs orders 7ID to reinforce BLF on northern Belesia.

**18-23 September 2022:** Olvanan MEBlands forces on Panay, Bohol, and Mindanao largely due to Olvana employing commercial and merchant vessels to assist the movement of landing vessels for the Olvanan Forces. 1 MEB begin their invasion on the island Panay.Olvanan forces seize multiple SPOD’s on Panay at Dillingham, Bellows and Haleiwa.

**20 September 2022:** SECDEF determines that a ground assault must be committed to liberate Belesia from Olvanan control.

**21-22 September 2022*:*** 1 MEB seizes the port on Hilo (Mindanao).

**19-20 September 2022*:*** 1 MEB secures a beachhead on Maalae, Bohol.

**23 September 2022:** Port of Kaneohe Bay severely damaged and rendered non-mission capable due to naval engagements on Panay.

**24 September 2022:** Additional Southern Fleet movement from Shanghai to Belesia continues.

**24 September 2022:** Belesian forces encounter 1 MEB forces employing chlorine munitions during engagements. ***(Analyst Comment: The Tantoco Cartel in Belesia has a history of illegally acquiring chlorine and other chemicals to help finance other criminal operations. Past Belesian intelligence reports show a pattern of the group selling to the highest bidder not only technical grade chlorine, but also rudimentary chemical warfare weapons. Exposure to high concentrations of chlorine gas can cause corneal burns, burning pain on exposed skin, and pulmonary edema; at certain concentrations, it can cause death within just a few minutes.)***

**25 September 2022:** 7ID occupies defensive positions in northern Belesia.

**28 September 2022:** The 473rd (Panay, Bohol) and 474th MTZD BDE (Mindanao) conducts battle handover with 1 MEB forces.

**29 September 2022:** 1 MEB departs Panay and Bohol.

**29 September 2022:** The 450th MECH BDE and 476th MTZD BDE conducts battle handover with the 842nd Amphibious Brigade in Southern Belesia. The 841st Amphibious Brigade, 475th MTZD BDE and 449th MECH BDE maintained as the 16th Army operational reserve IVO Shanghai.

**01 October 2022:** Olvana continues deployment of forces to Panay and establishes an A2/AD bubble and coastal artillery forces and SSM force. The bubble is supported by motorized forces IVO Makua, Dillingham, Ka’ula, Kahukus, Basilan, Wahiawa, and Bellows.

**03 October 2022:** 25 ID TAC arrives on ISB Guam.

**07 October 2022:** 3/25 ID arrives at ISB Guam.

**10 October 2022:** 2/25 ID arrives at ISB Guam.

**17 October 2022:** 29 IBCT arrives at ISB Guam.

**NLT 23 October 2022**: 3/25 ID deploys to Bohol.

**NLT 23 October 2022:** 2/25 ID deploys to Panay.

1. See special report on the NSRI project in Annex B (Intelligence) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)